

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 NASSAU 02141 01 OF 02 200203Z

65

ACTION ARA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 FEA-01 DHA-02 STR-04 EUR-12 SCA-01

SCS-03 ACDA-05 AGR-05 AID-05 CEA-01 CEQ-01 CG-00

CIAE-00 CIEP-01 OFA-01 COME-00 DLOS-04 DODE-00 DOTE-00

EB-07 EPA-01 ERDA-05 FMC-01 TRSE-00 H-02 INR-07

INT-05 IO-10 JUSE-00 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 NSF-01

OES-03 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-04 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 NSCE-00

SSO-00 USIE-00 INRE-00 FRB-03 XMB-02 OPIC-03 LAB-04

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O 192325Z DEC 75

FM AMEMBASSY NASSAU

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7659

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 NASSAU 2141

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: EAID BEXP EFIS EINV MORG MARR CFED PFOR BF

SUBJ: TOUR D'HORIZON WITH PRIME MINISTER PINDLING

1. SUMMARY: AMBASSADOR SPENT 90 MINUTES WITH PM PINDLING AND SECRETARY TO THE CABINET RODNEY BAIN. PURPOSE WAS BROAD YEAR-END EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON PROBLEMS OF COMMON INTEREST. ITEMS TOUCHED UPON INCLUDED: (A) ANDROS AID PROGRAM, (B) WATER PROBLEMS, (C) LOBSTERS, (D) FUTURE OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT, (E) PROJECTED BAHAMIAN DEFENSE FORCE AND YOUTH CORPS, (F) FACILITIES AGREEMENT, (G) IRS. DETAILS FOLLOW ON ALL ITEMS EXCEPT RELATING TO FACILITIES, WHICH WILL BE SUBJECT OF SEPTTEL. END SUMMARY.

1. AFTER EXCHANGE OF PLEASANTRIES, AT WHICH TIME AMBASSADOR PRESENTED ALISTAIR COOKE'S BOOK, "AMERICAN," TO PM, I
CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 02 NASSAU 02141 01 OF 02 200203Z

EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT WE COULD HAVE A TOUR D'HORIZON

COVERING THOSE MATTERS OF PRINCIPAL INTEREST TO USG AND GCOB SO THAT WE MIGHT GO INTO THE NEW YEAR WITH BEST POSSIBLE UNDERSTANDING OF EACH OTHER'S VIEWS. PM WARMLY WELCOMED THE IDEA.

3. ANDROS PROJECT AND AGRICULTURE. PM EXPRESSED SATISFACTION WITH OUR EFFORT OF THE PAST YEAR TO DEVELOP AN EFFECTIVE PLAN AND WITH THE IMPLEMENTATION AS IT HAS GONE FORWARD. IN SHARING VIEW OF PROGRESS OF PLAN, I NOTED THAT ULTIMATE SUCCESS WILL BE DEPENDENT UPON FUTURE GCOB POLICY, WHETHER GOVERNMENT IS ABLE TO CONTINUE THE PROJECT AS USG PHASES OUT AND WHETHER FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD AGRICULTURE CAN BE GENERATED WITHIN THE POPULATION. PM RESPONDED VIGOROUSLY SAYING HE QUITE AGREED. IT WAS CLEAR, HE SAID, THAT SIMPLY PREACHING TO BAHAMIANS WOULD NOT CONVINCE THEM THAT THE HARD WORK INVOLVED IN FARMING WAS SOMETHING TO WHICH THEY SHOULD BE ATTRACTED. HE WENT INTO LENGTHY DESCRIPTION OF PRESENT BAHAMIAN FARMING AND FISHING METHODS WHICH HE DESCRIBED AS INVOLVING CRUDE AND RELATIVELY UNREWARDING LABOR. WHAT GOVERNMENT INTENDED TO DO WAS BUILDING UPON THE ANDROS EXPERIENCE, DEVELOP A GREATER DEGREE OF MECHANIZATION IN FARMING THEREBY DEMONSTRATING TO POPULACE THAT APPLICATION OF MODERN MACHINERY AND TECHNIQUES CAN MAKE FARMING A REWARDING ENDEAVOR. HE MENTIONED AMONG OTHER THINGS A PLAN TO DEVELOP CORN AND SORGHUM ON ANDROS AND ABACO SUFFICIENT TO PROVIDE ALL FEED PRODUCTS REQUIRED FOR CATTLE, PIGS AND POULTRY, THUS HELPING TO MAKE BAHAMAS MORE SELF-SUFFICIENT THESE AREAS. HE NOTED IN PASSING THAT AT RECENT MEETING OF COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT IN THE CARIBBEAN, IT WAS AGREED THAT A "PLAN WOULD BE DEVELOPED FOR ALL CARIBGEAN STATES TO SIMILARLY CONTRIBUTE TO DEVELOPMENT OF AGRICULTURAL INDUSTRY LOOKING TOWARD SELF-SUFFICIENCY." COMMENT: HIS COMMENTS ON AGRICULTURE FURTHER FORTIFY EARLIER INDICATIONS TO ME THAT GOVERNMENT INTENDS TO MAKE MAJOR EFFORT TO PUSH MECHANIZATION OF FARMING. THIS IS CLEARLY ONE OF THE AREAS ON WHICH THEY ARE HOPING THEY CAN GET SOME SORT OF FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE IN THE WAY OF LOANS FROM U.S. GOVERNMENTAL OR PRIVATE INSTITUTIONS.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 NASSAU 02141 01 OF 02 200203Z

4. WATER PROBLEMS. DISCUSSION ON ANDROS AGRICULTURE LED TO MENTION OF FACT THAT EMBASSY WAS DOING ALL IN ITS POWER TO FACILITATE GCOB SEARCH FOR WATER BARGES TO MOVE WATER FROM ANDROS TO NEW PROVIDENCE. HOWEVER, I MENTIONED IN THIS CONNECTION, QUALIFYING MY WORDS CAREFULLY TO THE EFFECT THAT THIS WAS PRELIMINARY INFORMATION THE VALIDITY OF WHICH REMAINED TO BE TESTED, THAT THERE WERE SOME U.S. EXPERTS WHO BELIEVED ANDROS COULD NOT BOTH SUPPORT THE

WATER BARGING PROGRAM AND CONTINUED AND EXPANDED AGRICULTURAL PROGRAM. PM REPLIED THAT FRANKLY HE HAD SIMILAR CONCERN IN THE BACK OF HIS MIND. AT THE MOMENT HE WAS PROCEEDING BASED ON BEST EXPERT ADVICE AVAILABLE TO HIM. HE ALSO NOTED, IN RESPONSE TO MY QUESTION, THAT NORTH ANDROS WAS CHOSEN FOR DEVELOPMENT FOR BARGING OPERATION BECAUSE WATER WAS MOST PLENTIFUL AND WAS MOST ACCESSIBLE TO THE SEA AND BECAUSE OF PORT AND DOCKING FACILITIES. I INDICATED THAT I HOPED TO LOOK FURTHER INTO THIS QUESTION AND WOULD SEEK TO SECURE FURTHER EXPERTISE FROM U.S. ON WATER TABLE QUESTION. PM STATED HE WOULD BE APPRECIATIVE OF ANY EFFORTS WE COULD MAKE ALONG THOSE LINES. COMMENT: ON THE WATER PROBLEM, WE HAD BEEN TOLD THAT EXPERTS IN MINISTRY OF WORKS HAD ASSURED CABINET THAT AT RATE OF EXPLOITATION PROJECTED THERE SHOULD BE NO PROBLEM. CLEARLY PM REMAINS CONCERNED ABOUT VALIDITY OF THAT ESTIMATE. WE WILL CHECK WITH AID TO SEE IF WE CAN GET FURTHER EXPERT ADVICE.

5. LOBSTERS. I INDICATED TO PM THAT WE, OF COURSE, CONTINUED TO HEAR FROM AMERICAN FISHERMEN AND THEIR CONGRESSMEN WHO REMAIN CONCERNED RE THEIR EXCLUSION FROM GCOB SHELF. I SAID THAT AT THIS POINT WE WERE ONLY ABLE TO SAY THAT WE WERE STILL AWAITING GCOB RESPONSE TO OUR NOTE PROPOSING THAT WE GO TO INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND FURTHER THAT I HAD NO INDICATION FROM GOVERNMENT THAT ACCESS TO AMERICAN FISHERMEN TO SHARE BAHAMIAN LOBSTER RESOURCE WAS IMMINENT. I ASKED PM IF HE WOULD COMMENT. HE CAREFULLY AVOIDED COMMENT ON ICJ. HE CONFIRMED THAT HE SAW NO LIKELIHOOD IN FORESEEABLE FUTURE OF U.S. FISHERMEN BEING GIVEN ACCESS TO THE SHELF. HE NOTED IN THIS REGARD THAT CUBANS CONTINUED TO PRESS FOR NEGOTIATIONS AND HE HAD INSTRUCTED ADDERLEY TO INDICATE THAT, WHILE GCOB

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 NASSAU 02141 01 OF 02 200203Z

DID NOT SEE LIKELIHOOD THAT SUCH NEGOTIATIONS COULD BE PRODUCTIVE, THEY WOULD AS A MATTER OF COURTESY BE WILLING TO MEET WITH CUBAN DELEGATION. NO DATE HAD BEEN SET. PM WENT ON TO NOTE EXPLICITLY THAT HE DID NOT FORESEE LIKELIHOOD OF AGREEMENT. "IF ANYTHING, IT IS LESS LIKELY THAN THAT AN AGREEMENT COULD HAVE BEEN NEGOTIATED WITH THE U.S. AT LEAST WITH THE U.S. THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE EMPATHY AND CULTURAL AND OTHER TIES. QUITE THE OPPOSITE IS TRUE WITH REGARD TO CUBA. STILL IT PROBABLY WOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED POLITE IF WE DID NOT TALK." PM WENT ON TO COMMENT ON ARREST OF CUBAN FISHERMEN, NOTING THAT HE HAD RECENTLY BEEN INFORMED THAT THERE WERE STILL ADDITIONAL CUBAN BOATS FISHING IN SOUTHERN BAHAMIAN WATERS AND HE HAD INSTRUCTED THE POLICE JUST TODAY TO GO OUT AND ARREST THEM. I ASKED HOW THEY HANDLED COMMUNICATIONS

WITH CUBAN GOVERNMENT ON ARRESTS. PM SAID THAT THEY
ASK UK GOVERNMENT IN HAVANA TO INFORM CUBAN GOVERNMENT AND
TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER BOATS WERE PRIVATELY OWNED OR PART
OF STATE CORPORATION. THIS WAS NECESSARY TO ESTABLISH
NATURE OF LEGAL DEFENDANT. IN EITHER EVENT, OF COURSE,
FINES WERE LEVIED BEFORE BOATS WERE RELEASED.

COMMENT: PM'S POSITION ON LOBSTERS ONLY CONFIRMED WHAT
WE HAD ALREADY KNOWN. HE OBVIOUSLY DID NOT WISH TO SPEAK
TO ICJ ISSUE AND, SINCE I HOPE SOON TO BE ABLE TO PRESENT
A MORE EXPLICIT REQUEST FOR A RESPONSE TO THE MINEXTAFF,
I DID NOT ATTEMPT TO PUSH ON THIS POINT. PM AS ALSO
OBVIOUSLY ATTEMPTING TO GO OUT OF HIS WAY TO MAKE CLEAR
THAT CUBANS WOULD BE TREATED JUST AS ROUGH, IF NOT
ROUGHER, THAN AMERICANS IN THEIR ATTEMPTS TO EXPLOIT
BAHAMIAN LOBSTERS. SINCE PM REITERATED, AS HE HAD TO ME
PREVIOUSLY, THAT THEY FELT U.S. OFFER AT THE TIME OF
LOBSTER NEGOTIATIONS "WAS VERY THIN" I COULD ONLY IMAGINE
A GCOB/CUBAN AGREEMENT ON LOBSTERS IF THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT
OFFERED VERY SUBSTANTIAL FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FOR THE
PRIVILEGE.

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PAGE 01 NASSAU 02141 02 OF 02 200329Z

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 NASSAU 2141

6. INVESTMENT. I NOTED THAT BASED ON PM'S SPEECH TO RECENT PLP CONVENTION, SUBSEQUENT REPORT OF WORKING COMMITTEE OF CONVENTION AND FOLLOW-UP PUBLIC DISCUSSION, THIS MATTER WAS VERY MUCH IN THE FOREFRONT OF PUBLIC ATTENTION. I INDICATED THAT EMBASSY HAD RECEIVED SUBSTANTIAL NUMBERS OF INQUIRIES (AS IN FACT WE HAVE) CONCERNING INTERPRETATION TO BE PLACED ON GCOB PROGRAM. PM RESPONDED BY SAYING THAT HE WAS AWARE OF CONSIDERABLE CONFUSION WHICH EXISTED ON THIS ISSUE. IN FACT, HE HAD PLANS IN THE WORKS FOR A SERIES OF SEMINARS TO BE HELD IN NASSAU AND FREEPORT TO WHICH ALL OF BUSINESS COMMUNITY WOULD BE INVITED SO THAT CLARIFICATION AS TO EFFECT ON INDIVIDUAL BUSINESSES COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED. HOWEVER, AS TO PURPOSE OF PROGRAM, PM STATED THAT PROGRAM WAS DESIGNED TO DISCOURAGE FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT INTO SMALL BUSINESSES WHICH "UNDULY COMPETE WITH BAHAMIAN ENTREPRENEURIAL SKILLS."
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 NASSAU 02141 02 OF 02 200329Z

CONCERN THAT SMALL BUSINESSES CURRENTLY OWNED BY FOREIGNERS WOULD BE FORCED TO SELL WAS, SO FAR AS HE COULD SPEAK TO THE ISSUE, NOT HIS POLICY. HE COULD NOT SAY WHAT SOME FUTURE GOVERNMENT MIGHT DETERMINE. I POINTED OUT TO HIM THAT WE WERE ALREADY RECEIVING REPORTS THAT SOME BAHAMIANS WERE SEEKING TO PURCHASE U.S. OWNED PROPERTIES WITH THE VEILED THREAT THAT THE OWNER HAD BETTER SELL NOW WHILE HE COULD STILL GET A FAIR PRICE SINCE HE WOULD BE FORCED TO SELL LATER FOR WHATEVER HE COULD GET. PM ACKNOWLEDGED THAT SUCH PRACTICES UNDOUBTEDLY OCCURRED AND EXPRESSED VIEW THAT HE DID NOT SEE HOW THESE COULD BE CONTROLLED. I INDICATED THAT THE GENERAL EFFECT OF THE STATED POLICY TOGETHER WITH EXAMPLES SUCH AS I HAD JUST INDICATED, WAS TO STIR UP CONSIDERABLE INVESTOR UNCERTAINTY. PM'S RESPONSE WAS THAT GOVERNMENT STILL ENCOURAGED FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN LARGE INDUSTRIES BUT WAS INTENT ON MOVING TOWARD BAHAMIANIZATION IN SMALLER INDUSTRIES. "HOW FAR WE CAN GO WILL OBVIOUSLY BE A FUNCTION OF CAPABILITY, AVAILABILITY OF CAPITAL, ETC."
COMMENT: I WAS LEFT WITH THE DISTINCT MIXED FEELING CONCERNING PM'S COMMENTS ON INVESTMENT PROGRAM. I CAN UNDERSTAND AND EVEN HAVE SOME SYMPATHY FOR HIS DESIRE TO "DEVELOP THE ENTREPRENEURIAL SKILLS" OF BAHAMIANS, ESPECIALLY IN SMALLER INDUSTRIES. AT THE SAME TIME, IT DOES NOT APPEAR TO ME THAT THE FULL IMPACT OF THEIR PROGRAM HAS BEEN THOUGHT THROUGH. IN PARTICULAR, THE UNCERTAINTY WHICH IT PROJECTS INTO THE TOTAL INVESTMENT CLIMATE DOWN HERE, EVEN EXTENDING INTO THOSE SORTS

OF ENDEAVORS WHICH THE GOVERNMENT AT LEAST AT THIS TIME HAS NO INTEREST IN BAHAMIANIZING. MOREOVER, I FELT THAT HE HEDGED ON THE QUESTION OF FORCED SALE. AT ONE POINT, FOR EXAMPLE, I NOTED TO HIM THAT CONCERNS HAD BEEN EXPRESSED THAT THE GOVERNMENT COULD ASSERT LEVERAGE WITHOUT ACTUALLY LEGALLY DEMANDING A SALE, FOR EXAMPLE, THROUGH REFUSAL TO RENEW WORK PERMITS. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THIS WAS TRUE AND MADE NO EFFORT TO REJECT, NOT TO MENTION VIGOROUSLY REJECT, ANY SUCH INTENTION ON THE PART OF THE GOVERNMENT. IN FACT, HIS QUALIFIED REMARKS ABOUT THE UNCERTAIN FUTURE GAVE WEIGHT TO THE ARGUMENT THAT PRESSURES MAY VERY WELL BE GENERATED IF NOT BY THE GOVERNMENT THEN AT LEAST WITH ITS ACQUIESCENCE. AT THE
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 NASSAU 02141 02 OF 02 200329Z

SAME TIME, SINCE THEY CLEARLY ARE INTERESTED IN SECURING CONSIDERABLE INVESTMENT IN LARGER UNDERTAKINGS, THEY WILL EVENTUALLY HAVE TO COME TO GRIPS WITH THE IMPACT OF THE UNCERTAINTY THAT THE CURRENT PROGRAM ENTAILS.

7. DEFENSE FORCE. I SAID, OF COURSE, THAT I HAD SOME FAMILIARITY WITH GCOB THINKING BUT WOULD BE INTERESTED IN HIS COMMENTS CONCERNING MORE SPECIFIC ASPECTS OF PURPOSE, SIZE, FINANCING AND RELATIONSHIP TO PROJECTED YOUTH CORPS PROGRAM. PM RESPONDED BY SAYING THAT PURPOSE WAS ESSENTIALLY THAT AS LAID DOWN IN HIS SPEECH TO PLP CONVENTION: AN EXPANDED COAST GUARD CAPABILITY. HE SEES THIS AS STEMMING INITIALLY FROM EXPANSION OF CURRENT MARINE POLICE FORCE. HE DID NOT RESPOND TO MY QUESTION CONCERNING SIZE, STATING ONLY THAT THIS WOULD HAVE TO BE DETERMINED OVER THE FUTURE. AS TO COMPENSATION, HE REFERRED TO THE REPORTS WHICH U.S. AND UK GOVERNMENTS HAD PROVIDED WHICH "ESSENTIALLY WAS A PROJECTION OF WHAT WAS REASONABLE FOR THE BAHAMAS." I SAID THAT I WAS OF COURSE FAMILIAR IN DETAIL WITH U.S. REPORT AND WAS AWARE OF UK REPORT, BUT WAS NOT FAMILIAR WITH ITS DETAILS. I THEREFORE HAD NO OPINION CONCERNING HOW REASONABLE A PROJECT THAT CONTAINED. (PM SEEMED SOMEWHAT SURPRISED THAT WE WERE NOT FAMILIAR IN DETAIL WITH UK REPORT. IN FACT HE PROBABLY KNEW PERFECTLY WELL THAT WE HAD BEEN HAVING DISCUSSIONS WITH BRITISH BUT, OF COURSE, I DID NOT FEEL FREE TO INDICATE WE HAD COPY THEIR REPORT.) I ASKED WHETHER BRITISH HAD COSTED THEIR PROPOSED PROGRAM. PM INDICATED THAT HE DID NOT RECOLLECT THAT THEY HAD, ALTHOUGH HE THOUGHT IT WAS IN SAME GENERAL MAGNITUDE OF OURS. HE WENT ON, HOWEVER, TO SAY THAT LIKE OURS UK PROGRAM EXCLUDED NECESSARY LAND BASED INFRASTRUCTURE. I ASKED PM WHETHER THEY HAD MADE A TOTAL PROJECTION OF FINANCIAL REQUIREMENTS FOR THE FORCE SINCE FROM MY OWN EXPERIENCE MILITARY FORCES TENDED TO BE VERY EXPENSIVE.

HE AGREED WITH THE COMMENT, BUT SAID THAT THEY HAD NOT.
SO FAR AS IS RELATED RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DEFENSE AND
YOUTH CORPS, THERE WAS NONE. HE DESCRIBED YOUTH CORPS
AS A SLIGHTLY EXPANDED EAGLE SCOUT PROGRAM. AGAIN HE
OFFERED NO DETAILS OF SIZE OR TIMING.
COMMENT: I DID NOT GET THE IMPRESSION THAT THE PM HAD A
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PAGE 04 NASSAU 02141 02 OF 02 200329Z

VERY SHARPLY DEFINED OR FIXED SCHEDULE FOR DEVELOPING
THE DEFENSE FORCE. HE AVOIDED ANY INDICATION OF ITS SIZE
AND AS A GUESS I WOULD SAY HE DOESN'T KNOW WHAT THE SIZE
WILL BE. HE APPEARS TO BE APPROACHING IT PRAGMATICALLY,
I.E., DEVELOPING AN EXPANDED MARINE POLICE CAPABILITY.
ONE QUITE INTERESTING POINT: THOUGH I GAVE HIM EVERY
OPPORTUNITY TO DO SO, HE IN NO WAY IMPLIED ANY TIE-IN
BETWEEN FINANCING THE DEFENSE FORCE AND OUR FACILITIES
QUID. AS NOTED IN SEPTTEL, IT MAKES ME WONDER
WHETHER THAT PRESUMED TIE-IN DOES NOT EXIST MORE IN THE
MIND OF BRITISH HIGH COMMISSIONER MENNELL THAN IN THAT OF
THE BAHAMIANS.

8. IRS. AFTER DISCUSSION ON OUR FACILITIES NEGOTIATION
TO BE REPORTED IN SEPTTEL, PM ASKED ME TO BRING HIM UP-
TO-DATE ON STATUS OF IRS MATTER. THIS I DID. HE THEN
INQUIRED AS TO WHETHER ONCE THE CURRENT ISSUE WAS COMPLETELY
DISPOSED OF HE COULD EXPECT US TO WORK OUT AN ARRANGEMENT
WITH GOVERNMENT WHICH WOULD AVOID FURTHER PROBLEMS OR
WHETHER GCOB WOULD BE FACED WITH SIMILAR PROBLEMS WITH
IRS OFFICIALS IN THE FUTURE. I RESPONDED BY SAYING THAT
IF CURRENT INVESTIGATION DEMONSTRATED INAPPROPRIATE
OR ILLEGAL ACTIONS BY U.S. OFFICIALS, I COULD ASSURE
HIM THAT THEY WOULD NOT BE TOLERATED IN THE FUTURE. I
NOTED FURTHER THAT I HAD HAD RECENT DISCUSSION WITH MIN
EXTAFF ADDERLEY IN WHICH HE HAD INDICATED THAT PRIVATE
ARRANGEMENTS COULD BE WORKED OUT BETWEEN OUR TWO GOVERN-
MENTS DESIGNED TO FULFILL LEGITIMATE USG REQUESTS FOR
INFO ON ESSENTIALLY THE BANK MATTERS WHICH IRS WAS INTERESTED
IN. I SAID THAT I HAD ACCEPTED MR. ADDERLEY'S INVITATION
TO GO INTO THAT SUGGESTION IN DETAIL AS SOON AS CURRENT
IRS PROBLEM WAS CLEARED UP.

COMMENT: IT WAS MADE PERFECTLY CLEAR TO ME BY
MANNER OF PM'S PRESENTATION THAT THE IRS PROBLEM CONTINUES
TO TROUBLE HIM. GIVEN THE WAY HE PUT THE ISSUE TO ME,
I BELIEVE THEIR CONCERN IS THAT THEIR BANKING COMMUNITY
CAN LIVE THROUGH ONE SCANDAL, ESPECIALLY IF THIS IS FOLLOWED
BY AN APOLOGY FROM USG AND AN ASSURANCE THAT INAPPROPRIATE
INVESTIGATIONS WILL NOT CONTINUE INTO
FUTURE. HOWEVER, IF TO THE CONTRARY, THERE WERE OTHER
IRS INVESTIGATIONS AND REVELATIONS, THEN CONFIDENCE IN
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PAGE 05 NASSAU 02141 02 OF 02 200329Z

THE BANKING SECRECY LAWS WOULD BE SHAKEN ENDANGERING
BAHAMIAN ABILITY TO CONTINUE TO OPERATE AS A VERY LARGE
BANKING CENTER. AT THE SAME TIME, HE RESPONDED
POSITIVELY TO MY COMMENT ON MY CONVERSATION WITH
ADDERLEY INDICATING THAT HE BELIEVED WE COULD WORK OUT
COOPERATIVE ARRANGEMENTS TO GET LEGITIMATELY REQUIRED
IRS INFORMATION. I BELIEVE HE WILL PERSONALLY SUPPORT
SUCH AN UNDERSTANDING SUBJECT, OF COURSE, TO THE
SPECIFICS OF THE INDIVIDUAL CASES.
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